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ICC Fugitives: The Need for Bespoke Solutions
Beth Van Schaack*
This article appeared as part of UCLA School of Law’s forum on the International Criminal
Court established as part of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project in partnership with
the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
I.

Introduction

It is axiomatic that the International Criminal Court (ICC) depends on the cooperation of the
international community, including state parties and non-party states alike, to carry out its
mandate to prosecute the “most serious crimes of international concern.” Nowhere is this
dependency more apparent than with respect to the imperative of gaining custody of the accused.
The Court cannot proceed in absentia;1 if it is to carry out its mandate, the accused must be
detained and transferred to The Hague. Given the centrality of this issue to the Court’s success,
the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties in a consensus resolution on cooperation recently
Express[ed] serious concerns that arrest warrants or surrender requests against 14
persons remain outstanding, and call[ed] on States to cooperate fully in
accordance with their obligation to arrest and surrender to the Court…
It is anticipated that the Assembly of States Parties will consider its provisional Arrest Strategy
Roadmap in greater detail over the course of 2013-14 with an eye toward creating a something
akin to an action plan at the next meeting of the ASP in December 2014 in New York.
The custody issue is a vexing one. Those situation countries that willingly submitted themselves
to the ICC’s jurisdiction are often weakly governed; their authorities may find it difficult
(logistically, politically, or both) to gain custody of rebel leaders in areas in which the state
exercises little control or authority, notwithstanding Rome Statute obligations to “cooperate
fully” with the Court.2 Those situation countries whose officials are subject to ICC charges
pursuant to Security Council referrals may be hostile (e.g., Sudan) or ambivalent (e.g., Libya)
toward ICC jurisdiction. As non-ICC parties, they are subject only to those obligations that have
been imposed on them by virtue of the referral resolution, which may employ imprecise
language on this point—no doubt by design. Such states may refuse, or find it difficult in light
of internal political realities, to cooperate voluntarily with the Court or to appear to be doing so.
All told, given this situational variation, strategies aimed at gaining custody of one fugitive will
not necessarily be relevant to any other. Instead, the international community in coordination
with the Court needs to devise bespoke solutions. That said, there are some common approaches
that, if pursued, might bring closure to the pressing problem of at-large defendants.
*
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The international community must make a firm and concerted commitment to the goal of ending
this enduring impunity. The current state of affairs undermines the ICC itself and also the global
commitment to ensuring accountability for the worst international crimes. As the Court noted in
its 2013 Report on Cooperation:
Failure to arrest these individuals emboldens them and potential future
perpetrators, and fuels the perception that they can remain beyond the reach of the
Court and perpetrators can continue to commit crimes with impunity.
Moreover, as noted by the Court in its Report on Cooperation for the 12th ASP,
there are costs related to preserving evidence, maintaining contact with witnesses,
monitoring security and mitigating threats [to victims and witnesses]. These costs
will continue to run for as long as the relevant cases cannot be presented to the
Judges.3
At the same time, attaining this goal is important for reasons that are independent of the
legitimacy and efficacy of the ICC or of the system of international justice writ large. Many of
the ICC’s at-large defendants are today associated with the commission of grave international
crimes against civilians in the volatile region that encompasses eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Central African Republic, Darfur State, and the contested border regions of Southern
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. The international community has invested considerable
treasure and some blood in establishing stability in these regions; these efforts are being
undermined by the ICC fugitives, who are sources of persistent instability. Denying these
individuals safe haven and successfully transferring them to the Court thus serves an atrocities
prevention imperative in addition to making good on the promise of accountability for horrific
crimes already committed.
II.

Background

The ICC is not the first international tribunal to experience difficulty in gaining custody of
indictees. Devotees to this field will remember the frustration of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’s first prosecutors, whose indictments went
unexecuted even after allegations that the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and then
Stabilization Force (SFOR) allowed indictees to pass through checkpoints or otherwise go about
their business unmolested. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that ICTY prosecutors initiated
the case against Duško Tadić—a relatively small fish who at the time was facing charges in
Germany by way of its universal jurisdiction statute—out of desperation to have something to
do. It took 18 years to finally obtain custody over all the ICTY defendants, including Ratko
Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, and Goran Hadžić, all of whom had long eluded capture with the
help of a network of nationalistic supporters. That this feat was finally accomplished is largely
attributed to the fact that economic assistance as well as European Union accession and closer
ties to NATO via the Partnership for Peace were made contingent upon cooperation by the states
of the former Yugoslavia with the Tribunal.
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By contrast, the ICTR was able to start its work almost immediately given that—not without
controversy—all of its indictments targeted members and supporters of the former Hutu Power
regime, whom the triumphant Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was generally all too glad to see in
the dock. Twenty seven states in the region (including Kenya, Zambia, the Central African
Republic, and Cameroon) and beyond (Belgium, the United States, and Switzerland) also
facilitated the arrest of Rwandan suspects on the run and transferred them to the Tribunal.
Nonetheless, almost twenty years after the formation of that tribunal, nine fugitives (of 93
indictees) still remain at large. Tracking teams formed by the ICTR remain at work cultivating a
network of informants within the Rwandan diaspora and elsewhere; the government of Rwanda
has launched a similar team. It is anticipated that three high-value defendants will be prosecuted
by the Arusha branch of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT); the files of
the other six have been forwarded to the Rwandan authorities for eventual prosecution in
domestic courts. All nine remain subject to rewards for their capture pursuant to the U.S. State
Department’s War Crime Rewards Program (WCRP), which allows for the payment of rewards
leading to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of foreign nationals charged with war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or genocide. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) obtained custody
over all indicted individuals except Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who is rumored to be dead, although no definitive proof of this
has emerged. Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) had no
trouble launching proceedings against charged individuals, who were mostly septuagenarians
already in government custody (such as Duch) or easily located. If the ECCC decides to pursue
Cases 003 and 004, however, gaining custody of the accused may become an issue, since the
Government of Cambodia opposes further cases.
The challenges to obtaining custody of each current ICC fugitive are to a certain extent of a
different order. There is no regional political organization such as the European Union to exert
concerted pressure on actual or potential member states to execute arrest warrants. The ICC is
an independent body, rather than a subsidiary organ of the Security Council or an institution
created with a host state’s consent. The Court has received very little in the way of concrete
support from the Security Council, even in those cases that owe their provenance to a Chapter
VII resolution. Even states parties subject to treaty-based obligations to cooperate with the Court
have not done enough in this regard. Furthermore, the Court does not at present stand to benefit
from any tracking teams, transnational law enforcement efforts, or peacekeepers dedicated to the
capture and transfer of these individuals. In short, the ICC is in a much weaker position than the
prior ad hoc tribunals. As such, the international community needs to think creatively about new
solutions to the problem of fugitives and do more to make the capture of these individuals a
global priority.
III.

Situations-by-Situation Challenges & Opportunities

1. Uganda
The first arrest warrants issued by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in 2005 were against Joseph
Kony and four of his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) henchmen. Of the four, Dominic Ongwen
and Okot Odhiambo are still alive and at large. Vincent Otti and Raska Lukwiya are now dead—
the former was apparently executed on Kony’s orders and the latter died in combat with the
Ugandan People’s Defense Forces. The remaining LRA defendants have been on the run in one

of the most inaccessible and insecure parts of the world, which sits at the juncture of a set of
nations with only the most tenuous control over their hinterlands: the Republic of South Sudan
(RSS), the Central African Republic (CAR), Southern Darfur State in Sudan, the disputed Kafia
Kingi enclave between Sudan and RSS, and northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Dense foliage confounds aerial surveillance, and the LRA’s areas of activity are generally
outside established communications networks. The remaining few hundred LRA fighters are
reportedly living a nomadic lifestyle, traveling in small bands with their wretched abductees—
including a number of children—in tow. They are rumored to be a fractured bunch, suffering
from low morale and increasingly alienated from their messianic leader with whom they
communicate by courier.
These apparent schisms within the LRA offer an opportunity to divide and conquer by
weakening Kony’s protective network and sources of support. Uganda, its Western partners,
NGOs, and the Security Council have all endorsed a policy of encouraging defections. Regional
forces and NGOs have been dropping “come home” leaflets and broadcasting related messages
through the radio and from helicopter-mounted speakers in areas where there have been LRA
sightings. Many of the 33 individuals who defected in 2012 indicated that these efforts
influenced their decision to desert the LRA. Indeed, this defections strategy has motivated some
high-profile desertions (including one of Kony’s abducted “wives”), which have undoubtedly
generated valuable, if dated, information about Kony’s whereabouts and modus operandi.
Moreover, some key LRA leaders have been captured (e.g., Caesar Achellam in May 2012) or
killed (e.g., Vincent Binany Okumu in January 2013).
Uganda has enacted, let partially lapse, and re-activated an amnesty law that encourages the
defection of individuals engaged in an armed rebellion in exchange for promises of impunity and
reintegration. The Amnesty Act established an Amnesty Commission, which has to date issued
over 12,000 certificates of amnesty to LRA fighters. While such amnesty opportunities may be
acceptable for breaches of laws penalizing mere membership in the rebel group, or for forms of
armed rebellion, they raise acute international law, human rights, and fairness concerns when
they purport to extinguish liability for the commission of international crimes. The Ugandan
authorities must work to find the right balance between encouraging LRA members and
abductees to leave the group, while prosecuting those most responsible for serious human rights
violations. The donor community must maintain its support for regional efforts toward the
demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, and rehabilitation of current and former child
soldiers as well as and LRA abductees so that these individuals have something to “come home”
to.
The United States has made significant contributions to the regional Kony manhunt and related
efforts to suppress the LRA and rehabilitate LRA-affected regions. The Lord’s Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, signed into law by President Obama
in 2010, states that it is the policy of the United States to “work vigorously” to:
eliminat[e] the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army to civilians and regional stability
through political, economic, military, and intelligence support for a comprehensive
multilateral effort to protect civilians in affected areas, to apprehend or otherwise remove
Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield, and to disarm and demobilize
Lord’s Resistance Army fighters; and … further support comprehensive reconstruction,
transitional justice, and reconciliation efforts.

The Legislation also authorized the President to “provide assistance to respond to the
humanitarian needs of populations in northeastern Congo, Southern Sudan, and Central African
Republic affected by the activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
In 2011, President Obama with bipartisan support launched Operation Observant Compass and
sent 100 combat-equipped military advisors drawn from U.S. Special Operations Forces to assist
the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and an African Union Regional Task Force (AURTF) in their efforts to track Kony and “remov[e him] from the battlefield.” This is on top of the
provision of substantial matériel (including communications equipment, logistical support,
tactical equipment (e.g., night vision goggles), and vehicles) to this initiative. This operation has
since been re-authorized and expanded and is estimated to cost in the range of $4.5 million per
month. The advisors are meant to be just that—they are not mandated to engage LRA forces
unless necessary for self-defense. However, they are now authorized to conduct joint patrols
with their regional counterparts. Although Kony’s trackers have come very close to capturing
him, their efforts have been hindered by a whole host of challenges, including: the continued
need for training and capacity-building among local forces; variable permission to operate in
DRC; the unrest in neighboring CAR following the Seleka alliance coup, which suspended the
program for a spell; a lack of coordination between the troops of different sending states; the
difficult terrain and triple canopy jungle; potential intelligence leaks; the area’s porous borders;
and, at times, a lack of resolve among the regional troops. In addition, in the past, there were
allegations that Sudan was providing safe haven to LRA bands in retaliation against Uganda for
its support of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, although this support appears to have
subsided.
A major challenge to effectuating Kony’s capture has been the dearth of real-time information
about his whereabouts and movements. By the time word emerges of Kony’s appearance, he has
moved on, leaving a trail of destruction, abduction, displacement, and poaching behind him.
One solution to this obstacle is the development of better telecommunications capabilities in
LRA-affected communities (building cell towers, distributing cell and Thuraya satellite phones
with geo-location capacities, providing high-frequency radios, and creating hotlines and tip
lines), so people have a quick, secure, and costless ways to contact Kony’s pursuers in the event
that the LRA passes through an area. Such efforts will have the secondary effect of contributing
infrastructure to the much needed development of these regions.
The United States has also added Kony, Ongwen, and Odhiambo to its WCRP. This program
originally applied only to indictees of three ad hoc tribunals: the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. The
U.S. Congress amended the law in January 2013 to allow rewards to be offered for information
leading to the arrest or conviction of foreign nationals charged by any international tribunal,
including hybrid and mixed tribunals (such as the Bosnian Special Chambers or the proposed
mixed chambers for the DRC and Syria). In April 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry
designated the ICC’s LRA defendants into the expanded program. The program does not
authorize the payment of a “bounty” for delivering a fugitive “dead or alive”; rather, designees
must be fully prosecuted before any rewards will be issued. Nor does the program apply to
government agents (U.S. or foreign) who furnish information “while in the performance of his or
her official duties.” Thus, members of the UPDF and U.S. special forces may be ineligible for
rewards (although the former’s friends or relatives could conceivably benefit if they provide the
actionable information). To further motivate the UPDF, other states or entities could enact

complementary programs that would enable the payment of “bonuses” to UPDF or AU-RTF
troops who successfully capture Kony or his co-defendants and facilitate their transfer to The
Hague.
In parallel with this effort, the Department of Defense (DoD)’s African Command (AFRICOM)
also manages its own rewards programs in areas in which it operates. The DoD program enables
the payment of rewards for the provision of information with the primary goals of force
protection and counter-terrorism, including the arrest of wanted persons and the capture of
weapons caches. Rewards can be paid in connection with the Kony operation on either ground
since the LRA has been on the United States’ Terrorist Exclusion List since 2001, and Kony has
been on the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons created by Executive
Order 13224 since 2008. The DoD rewards, while not subject to the same restrictions as the
WCRP, tend to be smaller than those of the WCRP and can also be paid collectively and in kind
(with, e.g., food, vehicles, non-lethal equipment, infrastructure improvements, and local
amenities). Moreover, they can be paid close to immediately upon the provision of information.
An expansion of this program could amplify incentives to provide useful information to U.S.
personnel in the region. Both programs have benefited from an aggressive marketing campaign
involving posters, fliers, and other “bling.”
U.S. advisers have been in the region for months. Kony’s elusiveness is undoubtedly a source of
great frustration to members of the world’s most capable military. Nonetheless, it is the UPDF
and the AU-RTF who must ultimately effectuate Kony’s capture. Their endeavors quite simply
must be more professional and robust. Uganda must be encouraged to ensure that the U.S.
advisors are fully embedded with their host units and able to assist in coordinating the work of
AU-RTF units. Other donor states could assist the United States with maintaining coordinated
diplomatic support for the Operation, providing additional capacity building and matériel,
detailing more advisors and other personnel to the operation, encouraging regional cooperation
with the AU-RTF, or even pushing the relevant states to allow joint offensive operations. States
in the region must allow these teams free passage, refrain from offering any assistance to the
LRA, and provide Uganda, the United States, or the ICC with relevant information in a timely
fashion as it emerges.
Since the ICC arrest warrants were issued, Uganda has created a specialized International Crimes
Division (ICD), with jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The
Ugandan Supreme Court, which has had difficulty constituting itself for lack of a quorum, is set
to hear an appeal of Thomas Kwoyelo, a mid-level LRA commander who is being prosecuted in
the ICD, even though he is ostensibly entitled to amnesty under the Amnesty Act. There is, of
course, some chance that Uganda would choose to prosecute the LRA defendants itself in the
event that they are captured alive. President Museveni referred Uganda to the ICC in 2004,
effectively outsourcing these prosecutions notwithstanding a relatively effective and fair judicial
system. Given that the regional and domestic politics have evolved since the time of the referral,
he may decide to invoke complementarity and assert Uganda’s prerogative to prosecute Kony et
al. domestically. (Uganda’s Minister of Justice, however, has indicated Kony would be sent to
the ICC for trial). Given that the ICC has its hands full with its current caseload, an admissibility
challenge coupled with a robust domestic process may not be entirely unwelcome.

In sum, while there are areas where current efforts could be plussed up, the hunt for Joseph Kony
obviously does not lack for high level attention or resources. Accordingly, capturing the LRA
fugitives may just be a matter of time, persistence, and patience.
2. Darfur, Sudan
The Sudanese fugitives present a different set of challenges. Most importantly, they enjoy the
support and protection of the government of Sudan, which strenuously objects to ICC
jurisdiction. For the most part, and unlike the LRA defendants, the Darfur indictees’
whereabouts are often all too well known.4 Janjiweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al
Rahman (a.k.a. Ali Kushayb) was injured in battle last year and until recently was receiving
treatment in a Khartoum hospital. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein is the Minister of
National Defense and former Minister of the Interior and Special Representative in Darfur.
Ahmad Muhammad Harun was Minister of Humanitarian Affairs until he was appointed
Governor of South Kordofan state in May 2009. He was appointed in 2007 to lead the
investigation into human rights violations in Sudan—no doubt presenting an excruciating irony
to Darfuri victims. Harun has endeavored to rehabilitate himself by becoming essential to
negotiations with the SPLM-N rebel group over the disputed South Kordofan area, one of the
“Two Areas” currently wracked by violence in southern Sudan. Indeed, in January 2011, the UN
was excoriated for allowing Harun to travel on a UN helicopter in connection with negotiations
around ethnic clashes in the Abyei region of South Kordofan. It was also criticized for the fact
that Karen Tchalian, later chief of staff of the U.N./African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), met daily with Harun when the former worked for the U.N. Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) in Southern Kordofan. Harun remains an acting governor in the newly reconstituted
Kordofan states.
The fourth and final ICC fugitive, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir is—of course—Sudan’s head
of state, which presents its own set of challenges. Bashir appears regularly in the local media
and has travelled extensively—including to ICC state parties—effectively flaunting the two
outstanding arrest warrants against him. Indeed, since he was indicted in 2009, he has visited a
whole range of countries (including Chad (who also hosted Defense Minister Hussein in 2013),
China, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Libya (pre- and post-Qaddafi),
Qatar, and South Sudan), where he often enjoys a dignitary’s welcome.
Bashir’s radius has diminished considerably, however, in recent years. In 2013, for example, he
fled an African Union Special Summit on HIV/AIDs, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in Nigeria after
being in the country less than 24 hours following an effort by members of the local NGO
community to serve a summons on him. This happened amidst expressions of concern about the
visit from influential states and rumors that foreign powers might actually arrest him. It also
followed upon the issuance of a request to Nigeria by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II to immediately
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take him into custody5 and indications that Nigeria was “considering the necessary steps to be
taken in respect of his visit in line with [its] international obligations.” Prior to that, and
following a visit to Kenya, a court there issued a ruling indicating that Kenya was under an
obligation to arrest Bashir if he returned to the country. Bashir subsequently did not attend the
Kenyatta inauguration. Chad postponed its 2013 Greenbelt Conference of the Community of
Sahel-Saharan States upon learning Bashir would attend on Sudan’s behalf. Even in advance of
his 2011 trip to China—a non-party state that is ambivalent, at best, toward international justice
efforts, Bashir reportedly felt the need to confirm that he would not be arrested.
Other states that once allowed him to visit have since withdrawn their welcome, including
Malawi, which hosted Bashir in October 2011 for a summit of the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA). When confronted with a finding of non-cooperation by the
Court, Malawi replied that it had “accorded him all the immunities and privileges guaranteed to
every visiting Head of State and Government; these privileges and immunities include freedom
from arrest and prosecution within the territories of Malawi.” The newly installed administration
of Joyce Banda, however, relinquished the opportunity to host an AU summit in June 2012 —
losing tens of thousands of dollars in income for its hotels and other benefits in the process—
when Bashir indicated his intention to represent Sudan. In addition, Bashir has not pursued or
has cancelled potential visits to CAR, Zambia, Botswana, Uganda, and South Africa (for the
World Cup). Even Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan, ICC non-parties, refused permission for
Bashir’s plane to cross into their air space when Bashir sought to attend the Iranian inauguration
and meetings with China, respectively.
Bashir remains welcome in Ethiopia, a non-ICC party and the headquarters of the African Union.
Since Bashir was charged, tension has mounted between the AU and the ICC. Although African
states were instrumental in the formation of the ICC Statute and its entry into force, the
indictment of Bashir, as a sitting head of state, caused a volte face, at least among some AU
members. The AU has also rallied around President Kenyatta, who was indicted before he
became Kenya’s head of state but is now facing trial in The Hague along with his Deputy
President William Ruto. On their behalf, the AU has several times attempted to prompt the
Security Council to invoke Article 16 of the ICC Statute, which allows the Council to defer ICC
proceedings for a year in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers.6 Although Article 16 language
has been floated in the Council for both the Sudan and Kenya cases, it has been continually
blocked by the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and other Council members. When
the Council did not act upon one such request other than to take note of it in Resolution 1828 and
pledge to consider matters further, the AU adopted a decision in 2009 calling on its members to
withhold cooperation with the Court pursuant to Article 987 of the Rome Statute with respect to
5
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Article 98(1) states: “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
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the arrest or surrender of Bashir. Elements within the AU have tried to foment a broader antiICC campaign, as reflected in an Extraordinary Summit devoted to the ICC hosted recently in
Addis Ababa; however, AU members that remain supportive of the Court have managed to
temper these impulses. Although the Extraordinary Summit was poorly attended, the AU did
decide to seek the postponement of the Kenya and Sudan cases until the two heads of state are no
longer in office, although there has been no action yet at the Council and the Court has
postponed the start of the Kenyatta case until 2014—the third such delay. Although it is
doubtful that the Council would defer the Sudan cases in light of Sudan’s recalcitrance vis-à-vis
the Court, the Kenya case may present a different set of considerations. The Council, however,
recently rejected another deferral request for that situation.
Bashir even had the temerity to signal an intention to attend the 68th session of the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) meetings in September 2013 in New York, generating speculation as to
whether the United States would issue him a visa. Granting him permission to travel was
arguably mandated by two instruments: the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the UN and
the United States—which states at Section 11 that “the federal, state or local authorities of the
United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of
… representatives of Members”—and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (the so-called “General Convention”). A breach of the former Agreement
might have subjected the United States to binding arbitration with the UN according to Section
21; a breach of the latter treaty, to claims before the International Court of Justice under Section
30. The UN, however, had the power to waive the United States’ obligations under these
instruments (including under Article 20 of the General Convention if the immunity in question
“would impede the course of justice”), which it did not do. Per the Headquarters Agreement, the
UN can also “expel or exclude persons from the headquarters district for violation of its
regulations adopted … or for other cause” (emphasis added) In addition, there may have had a
basis to refuse Bashir entry pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Agreement, which states that the UN
shall
prevent the headquarters district from becoming a refuge either for persons who
are avoiding arrest under the federal, state, or local law of the United States or are
required by the Government of the United States for extradition to another
country, or for persons who are endeavouring to avoid service of legal process.
While acknowledging that the U.S. was under no formal obligation to arrest Bashir, PTC II
“invited” the United States to arrest and surrender him to the Court, and the ICC Registry sent a
note verbale to the U.S. embassy in The Hague requesting cooperation in this respect. The
President of the Assembly of States Parties, Tiina Intelmann, reminded potential transit states
that are also ICC States Parties “of their obligation to arrest and surrender Mr. Omar Al-Bashir to
the ICC.” (Bashir had indicated his intention to stop in Morocco, which has signed but not
ratified the Rome Statute, and may have been obliged to fly over European Union air space
above the Canary Islands). The UN remained largely silent about his potential visit and
scheduled him to address the Assembly on September 26. In the end, he did not attempt the trip,
and UNGA proceeded without him.

The international community could be more assertive about preventing Bashir’s travel.
Obviously, all states—and particularly ICC members—should refrain from inviting him to
events or otherwise facilitating his travel through granting fly-over or refueling rights. At the
same time, a strategy of containing Bashir presents a paradox. The more he is confined to
Sudan, the less likely it is that he might be arrested extraterritorially. He remains relatively safe
from capture within Sudan so long as he retains control over the reins of power and there are no
insiders or members of the burgeoning opposition willing to act against him. At the same time,
as his ability to travel internationally or visit with UN and other officials is further constrained,
the less effective he becomes as a representative of Sudan’s interests on the world stage. This
will decrease his base of support and signal to his inner circle that he has become a liability.
Were the United States to issue a reward for his and his compatriots’ arrest or capture under the
WCRP, it might further incentivize insiders to offer the ICC defendants up as a way to
rehabilitate Sudan’s standing in the international community (and advance their own pecuniary
interests).
Assuming that he continues to travel, state supporters of the Court should focus their intelligence
gathering on tracking his plans; share information on his whereabouts; establish an early warning
system when he is on the move; and generally do more than issue nebulous démarches to
potential host countries whenever Bashir reveals plans to travel beyond his borders. Hosting or
enabling the travel of Bashir should lead to tangible adverse consequences, including potentially
the loss of voting rights in international institutions such as the ASP. Likewise, states that
respect their international obligations and demonstrate a commitment to international justice, the
rule of law, and the promotion of international human rights should be rewarded. For example,
due to “a pattern of actions … inconsistent with the democratic governance criteria,” including
allowing the Bashir visit, the United States—at the urging of Republican Representative Frank
Wolf, a long-time critic of the Sudanese government—suspended Malawi’s $350M compact
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a foreign aid agency dedicated to alleviating
global poverty. The compact was re-instated following President Banda’s courageous decision
to forgo hosting the AU summit. Malawi subsequently received a number of favorable loans
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as a visit from Hillary
Rodham Clinton and later her husband and daughter. France, for its part, refused to attend a
Presidential ceremony in CAR if Bashir were present; the event proceeded without him.
Members of civil society must also remain attuned to Bashir’s travel and pressure potential
destination countries to either refrain from inviting him to events or to signal that he is an
unwelcome distraction at international gatherings. To extent that their legal systems allow for
private parties to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to principle of universal jurisdiction or
other forms of jurisdiction over extra-territorial crimes, NGOs should prepare complaints against
Bashir and have them ready to be filed in the event he indicates an intention to visit. Public
prosecutors and investigating judges should likewise pursue charges against him if they are
empowered to act independently of their executive branch (which would presumably have
extended any invitation). When Bashir does travel, these states should send extradition requests
to his destination countries. According to Amnesty International, 75 % of states have the ability
to exercise some form of universal jurisdiction over the three core international crimes.

Indeed, if Bashir had come for UNGA, the US could conceivably have arrested and prosecuted
Bashir under its genocide,8 torture,9 or use/recruitment of child soldiers10 statutes, all of which
allow for the assertion of universal jurisdiction. (Denmark hinted that it might take this route
when it hosted a 2009 UN Conference on Climate Change to which it felt obliged to invite all
heads of state). Or, the U.S. could have issued Bashir a visa with exceedingly tight restrictions,
an approach contemplated by Section 13(e) of the Headquarters Agreement, and then arrested
him on immigration violations in the event that he breached the terms of his visa.11 Such an
approach, however, may have implicated Section 13(a) of the Headquarters Agreement, which
states “[l]aws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the entry of aliens shall not
be applied in such manner as to interfere with the privileges referred to in Section 11.” But it
would be for the UN to assert any breach, unless Bashir were considered a third party beneficiary
to the Headquarters Agreement, which seems doubtful given that the immunities therein
accorded are for the benefit of the organization and not the personal benefit of representatives of
member states. The US could also have invoked its “security reservation” to the Headquarters
Agreement (as it did with respect to Yasser Arafat in 1988), providing that:
[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing,
abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own
security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the
United States other than the [U.N.] headquarters district and its immediate
vicinity…12
Had the United States taken Bashir into custody, there were potential impediments to the United
States transferring Bashir to The Hague directly. Although the American Servicemembers’
Protection Act (ASPA) limits the United States’ ability to provide some forms of assistance to
the Court, such a transfer would likely be permitted by the Dodd Amendment to ASPA, which
allows case-by-case assistance to the ICC.13 And, there is no Article 98 agreement between the
United States and Sudan that might have prevented the U.S. from transferring a Sudanese
national to the Court. However, a transfer would have required a valid extradition treaty or
executive agreement between the U.S. and the Court—such as the 1994 and 1995 congressionalexecutive Agreements on Surrender of Persons between the United States and the ICTY and
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18 U.S.C. § 1091. This statute was amended in 2009 to allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals
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jurisdiction until 2009, the crime of genocide has been punishable in the United States on other jurisdictional bases
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The Dodd Amendment, 22 U.S.C. §7433, states:
Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United states from rendering assistance to international
efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic and other foreign nationals
accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.

ICTR—or applicable legislation.14 No such agreement is in place with the ICC. (Because Bosco
Ntaganda voluntarily surrendered himself to the Court, the lack of such a legal framework was
not an issue to his transfer to The Hague.) However, the U.S. could conceivably have transferred
Bashir to an ICC member state, such as the Netherlands, for onward transit to the Court. Finally,
the U.S. could have extradited Bashir to another state with a live arrest warrant for him. The
existence of such a warrant in South Africa likely prevented Bashir’s travel to the inauguration
of President Zuma in May 2009.
At the behest of the ICC, and pursuant to a 2005 cooperative agreement between the two
institutions, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has circulated red notices
against almost all the individuals subject to ICC arrest warrants.15 One notable exception is
Bashir, apparently due to concerns about his entitlement to head-of-state immunity. If the OTP
were to seek a red notice against Bashir, and if Interpol were willing to issue one, it might make
it slightly more difficult for him to travel, particularly to non-ICC member states that have no
treaty-based obligation to effectuate the ICC’s arrest warrants. Although a red notice does not
obligate Interpol members to arrest a suspect, many Interpol members consider a red notice to be
a valid request for a provisional arrest. Such a notice would provide a separate basis of authority
to effectuate an arrest (particularly among non-ICC state parties) as well as signal international
opprobrium and offer states an excuse to withhold an invitation for him to visit when it might
otherwise be diplomatically awkward to do so.
Any Bashir arrest scenario requires the resolution of the issue of whether Bashir continues to
enjoy any form of head of state immunity under customary international law or any applicable
treaty.16 Arguably, Resolution 1593 removed any such immunity with respect to acts related to
ICC charges, either on its own force (by waiving on Sudan’s behalf any immunity in order to
effectuate Sudan’s UN Charter-based duty to cooperate with the Court) or by virtue of placing
Sudan in the same situation as a state party. All state parties are subject to Article 27, which
abrogates all such immunities before the Court.17 If he were indeed stripped of any immunity, all
UN member states could thus arrest him on the strength of the Security Council-backed arrest
14
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the UN-US Headquarters Agreement; the General Convention; and customary international law.
17
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This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament,
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.

warrant. Although, and as discussed below, the resolution makes clear that non-states parties are
not obligated to cooperate with the Court when it comes to effectuating its arrest warrants, the
resolution would permit states to do so by lifting Bashir’s immunities.
In conclusion, the situation involving the Sudanese defendants is categorically different than that
of the LRA defendants. There is no international manhunt for these individuals. Most of them
hold positions in government and are confined to Sudan, which gives them safe haven. Bashir is
increasingly trapped within his own borders. To date, no state has had the courage, political will,
or wherewithal to arrest him when he has traveled, in part because he has enjoyed the support of
the AU. The other Sudanese defendants, by contrast, are perhaps more dispensable and
vulnerable because they do not benefit from any claims to head-of-state immunity. Effectuating
the arrest and surrender of the remaining Darfur defendants may require a change in the domestic
political environment or an act of sovereign bravery coupled with an act of bravado by Bashir.
3. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
All but one of the DRC defendants is in custody, in trial, or pursuing an appeal.18 Sylvestre
Mudacumura, a commander in the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda
(FDLR) and the lone fugitive, is reportedly billeted somewhere in eastern DRC. The Hutudominated FDLR is composed of ex-génocidaires who fled Rwanda when the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) assumed control of the country following the 1994 genocide. For many years, it has
controlled territory and preyed on the civilian population in the DRC, particularly those of Tutsi
ancestry. A rival armed group, the M23 Movement, which is supported by the current Rwandan
Government in part as a proxy force against the FDLR, is also alleged to be responsible for
abuses against the civilian population in DRC. It has recently been defeated by the Forces
Armées de la Republique Démocratique de Congo (FARDC), with the crucial assistance of the
UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). It is now expected that the FARDC and
MONUSCO will turn their attention toward the FDLR. Additionally, there are rumors that
Mudacumura may be injured or ill. So far, other allegations that he might be negotiating his
surrender have not come to pass. Whatever his circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that his
presence in the region is a source of continued regional instability. The Security Council has
called expressly for his arrest; such arrest would demonstrate that the DRC and MONUSCO are
as committed to go after Rwanda’s enemies as they are to going after its allies.
The situation in the DRC benefits from a Security Council peacekeeping mandate that is the
most robust yet when it comes to the capture of fugitives. When the Security Council renewed
the mandate of the MONUSCO in 2013, it created an Intervention Brigade (IB) at the
recommendation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the
18
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) to address the continued instability and
threat posed by numerous armed groups (including the FDLR, M23, LRA, and various local and
loosely connected Mai Mai groups) in the region. Resolution 2098 of 2013 included language to
the effect that MONUSCO may “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians, neutralize
armed groups through the IB, and
support and work with the Government of the DRC to arrest and bring to justice
those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country,
including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC.
It also requests the Government of the DRC to arrest and hold accountable those responsible for
international crimes, including Mudacumura, in cooperation with the ICC. Prior formulations of
the mandate (e.g. UNSCR 2053 of 2012) had placed the primary responsibility for apprehending
fugitives in the hands of the Government of the DRC, in cooperation with the ICC, but called
upon MONUSCO to “support” the Congolese authorities in this regard. This new mandate is a
far cry from the days when SFOR/IFOR insisted that capturing war criminals from the war in the
former Yugoslavia—even though indicted by an international tribunal enjoying a Chapter VII
provenance—fell outside of their mandate and institutional competency. Similar language now
appears in the mandate of the peacekeeping force deployed in Mali—the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—which since 2012 is also an ICC
situation country, although no arrest warrants have been issued.19
In the event that Mudacumura has some freedom of movement, he may undertake the same
calculus as his compatriot, Bosco Ntaganda, who turned himself in when his followers were
routed by forces controlled by rival Sultani Makenga and were forced to flee across the border
into neighboring Rwanda. Ntaganda thus found himself in a country that had placed him in
charge of its proxy forces when they integrated with the FARDC in 2009, supported his M23
mutiny against the FARDC in 2012, but then dropped him in favor of Sultani Makenga in early
2013. Ntaganda obviously decided that facing charges before the ICC was a safer bet than the
fate that might befall him were he to remain on the run, go undercover in Rwanda, or linger
embedded within forces of dubious loyalty. The fact that the United States had recently
authorized the payment of a reward under the WCRP, a development that had not yet been
formally announced but had been made public in Jason Stearns’ well-read blog, may have played
a role in his decision to turn himself in on his own terms, rather than on the terms of a rewardseeker.
Because Mudacumura may have similar incentives to voluntarily surrender, members of
MONUSCO should develop a contingency plan in the event that he arrives on their doorstep.
This would include the establishment of temporary detention facilities meeting international
standards and an advanced agreement with the ICC on how to smoothly effectuate a transfer of
custody. MONUSCO should also use its communications channels with warring parties to
encourage this outcome. In coordination with the Court, it could also convey assurances
19

Specifically, UNSCR 2100 (April 25, 2013) empowers MINUSMA to:
To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional authorities of Mali, without
prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of
the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court…

regarding travel, the fate of family members, legal aid, and sentence enforcement. For its part,
the ICC should ensure it has ready access to a charter plane that can safely extricate
Mudacumura from the region and transport him to The Hague to face trial.
4. Côte d’Ivoire (CDI)
The CDI defendants are technically no longer “at large.” Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to The
Hague in November 2011 and is currently in pre-trial detention for crimes against humanity in
connection with the 2010 post-election violence. The charges have yet to be confirmed, and the
Prosecutor was invited in June 2013 to submit more evidence in support of her proposed charges.
Although the other two of the Ivoirian indictees—Simone Gbagbo and Blé Goudé—remain
outside of ICC custody, it is perhaps too early to consider them true fugitives. Both were subject
to sealed arrest warrants that were eventually made public in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Both
are now in CDI custody, and the country indicated that it is both willing and able to prosecute
them itself, notwithstanding that Mme Gbagbo’s husband will—if the charges are confirmed—be
tried by the ICC. CDI has begun a formal admissibility challenge pursuant to Article 19, which
is ongoing.
The country has recently initiated prosecutions against several former Gbagbo associates,
including his son, many of whom were extradited from neighboring Ghana after an initial period
of reluctance by Ghana to surrender Gbagbo’s partisans. This one-sided focus has drawn
criticism that President Alassane Ouattara is only interested in victor’s justice, since none of his
supporters has faced charges even though violence was perpetrated by both sides. CDI’s
commitment to launching a genuine transitional justice and national reconciliation process has
also been erratic.
When it comes to CDI, the international community and global civil society must maintain
respectful but firm pressure on the government to either (1) move forward with credible trials of
those ICC defendants in custody coupled with its formal admissibility challenge or (2) relinquish
jurisdiction to the Court, so the two CDI defendants can joint their compatriot Laurent Gbagbo in
The Hague.
5. Libya
Likewise, the Libyan defendants are not fully “at large.” Libya just recently won an
admissibility challenge with respect to Abdullah Al-Senoussi, paving the way for his domestic
prosecution (barring a successful appeal by the defense). The situation with respect to Saif AlIslam Gaddafi remains more complicated. He is in the custody of the Zintan brigade in Western
Libya, where he was captured in November 2011 trying to flee the country. Libya appears
poised to prosecute the two along with three dozen other Qaddafi insiders. It is widely assumed
that once sufficient concessions are extracted from the central government, the Zintanis will
consent to Gaddafi’s transfer to Tripoli.
The fact that the central authorities do not currently have custody of Gaddafi fils was a major
factor in the PTC ruling that his case is admissible before the Court. Specifically, PTC I focused
on prong two of the complementarity analysis—which relates to the national court’s ability to
stage the prosecution—as opposed to under prong one (willingness), primarily because Libya
was not able to secure the transfer of Gaddafi “into state custody.” The inadmissibility ruling is

currently on appeal. At the moment, the PTC has merely “remind[ed] Libya” of its obligation to
surrender Gaddafi to the Court, an obligation that had been suspended during the consideration
of the admissibility challenge. The Appeals Chamber rejected Libya’s motion for continued
suspensive effect of this obligation, even during the appeal of the admissibility challenge. In
July 2013, Gaddafi asked the Appeals Chamber to find Libya non-compliant and refer the matter
to the Security Council. The Chamber determined it did not have proper jurisdiction over the
request. So, the Court and Libya are poised on the verge of a confrontation that may eventually
go before the Security Council. It should be noted that Libya and the Court have a
memorandum of understanding in place with regard to the investigation of suspects.
IV.

Bilateral & Multilateral Strategies

Although the situation involving each fugitive is different, there is a range of ways that the
international community and international institutions can better support the ability of the Court
to carry out its mandate. In some cases, finding effective sources of pressure on the
territorial/custodial state may be useful to effectuate the capture and transfer of fugitives to the
Court. In other cases, it may be a neighboring or influential state(s), or a multilateral
organization, that has the real power to bring about this outcome. Ideally, of course, members of
the international community and the web of international institutions would be united in their
commitment to supporting the work of the Court and ending this unacceptable state of impunity.
1. The Assembly of States Parties
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is the natural place for this work to be coordinated,
especially given that states parties are obligated under the Statute to ensure that they devise
domestic procedures to provide all forms of cooperation with the Court,20 including with respect
to the arrest and surrender of charged persons.21 Indeed, the recent arrest by France, the DRC,
the Netherlands, and Belgium of four individuals accused of offenses against the administration
of justice in the Central African Republic case is an example of the kind of coordination that is
possible when political will exists.
The ASP has consistently called for states parties and non-party states alike to work toward this
end through the provision of both operational/technical assistance as well as political support on
a bilateral and multilateral level. Indeed, the ASP’s Bureau—the body’s executive committee,
which is made up of a President, two Vice Presidents, and 18 member representatives who serve
three-year terms upon election—issued in 2007 a report dedicated to the issue of cooperation
containing a set of 66 recommendations, of which several concern this issue. The ASP endorsed
these recommendations by consensus that year at the ASP plenary.
For example, Recommendation 17 states:
All States Parties should contribute where appropriate to generating political
support and momentum for the timely arrest and surrender of wanted persons both
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Article 88 states: “Availability of procedures under national law. States Parties shall ensure that there are
procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.”
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See in particular Articles 89-92 (concerning the arrest and surrender of persons of interest).

in their bilateral contacts and activities in regional and international
organisations.22
Thus, states parties should in their public statements and private consultations/démarches
encourage cooperation around fugitives. In addition, states can provide technical support (such
as specialized training to police and immigration officials) or second gratis personnel directly or
through expert rosters such as Justice Rapid Response to territorial states, as per recommendation
48:
All States Parties should consider whether it would be possible, on request, to
provide a State on whose territory suspects are located with technical assistance
and support such as information-sharing and specialised training of law
enforcement personnel.23
The ASP elevated the issue of cooperation during its 11th session in The Hague, with an
emphasis on the tracing and freezing of assets and, less so, on effectuating arrests, and asked the
Bureau to establish a foundation for cooperation among NGOs, states, relevant organizations,
and the Court. With facilitation by Norway, the Bureau followed up with a more fulsome report
on cooperation in 2013 containing an Arrests Strategy Roadmap. As a next step, the ASP should
create a more permanent body or mechanism (e.g., a standing committee or working group)
devoted to this issue to provide inter-sessional opportunities to engage in information sharing,
exchange best practices and lessons learned to develop and hone an experience-based analysis,
host expert-level discussions, and develop a network of committed states and individuals.
2. The United Nations
Pursuant to Article 2 of the ICC Statute,24 the Court and the United Nations have entered into a
Relationship Agreement that confirms the independence of both institutions and provides a basis
for a range of cooperative endeavors. This Agreement implies a role for the entire United
Nations when it comes to securing custody of the accused, but the Security Council deserves
special consideration. Although the situation in Darfur is before the Court by virtue of Security
Council Chapter VII Resolution 1593 issued in March 2005, the Council has done little to
effectuate the Court’s Darfur cases. When the Council referred the situation to the Court, it
echoed the language of Article 8625 and decided that the “Government of Sudan and all other
parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully and provide any necessary assistance to the
Court and the Prosecutor.” With this language, the Council arguably placed Sudan in the position
22
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of a State Party with respect to the situation in Darfur and its obligations toward the Court.
Regrettably, however, these same obligations do not extend to other U.N. Member states.
Rather, all other states are merely “urged” to render such cooperation.26 Thus, only ICC Member
states are under any express obligation to execute the ICC’s Darfur arrest warrants by virtue of
their ratification of the Rome Treaty.27 In addition, the Council also noted that states that are not
parties to the Rome Statute “have no obligation under the Statute” to cooperate with the Court.
Since the Darfur referral, the Council has received eighteen briefings by the Office of the
Prosecutor. The OTP’s interventions have conveyed mounting frustration at the lack of progress
in gaining custody of Sudanese fugitives and the “inaction and paralysis” within the Council.
The Council, for its part, has offered only vague rhetorical support for the Prosecutor’s efforts
and the imperative of ensuring accountability for abuses in Darfur. For example, when it
recently renewed the mandate of the United Nations‐African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) in Resolution 2113, the Council made no mention of the ICC, although it did make
more oblique reference to the importance of “ending impunity,” “ensuring justice for crimes
committed in Darfur,” “bring[ing] perpetrators … to justice,” “ensur[ing] accountability,” and
also called on all parties “to comply with their obligations under international human rights and
humanitarian law.” Most importantly, the Council has reacted with silence to findings of noncooperation by the Court with respect to Sudan,28 Malawi,29 Kenya,30 Djibouti,31 CAR,32 and
Chad,33 although the United States for one has called for more follow up by the Council. By way
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of comparison, the Council was much more aggressive in addressing the need to capture
fugitives from the ICTY. In Resolution 1207 (1998), for example, the Council:
Condemn[ed] the failure to date of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the
arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal [ICTY] against the three individuals [...] and
demand[ed] the immediate and unconditional execution of those arrest warrants,
including the transfer to the custody of the Tribunal of those individuals.
The Security Council must work internally to get to the point at which it can consider punitive
measures, especially in the face of flagrant non-compliance in Council-referred cases. The
Council could also issue an omnibus resolution in support of international justice generally, and
its two referrals specifically, enhancing the obligations on all states to cooperate in the arrest and
transfer of fugitives. At a minimum, members of the Security Council—either permanent or
temporary—should introduce specific language in appropriate resolutions to bolster existing
treaty-based or U.N. obligations around arrests.
Security Council Resolutions 1591 and 1672 (among others) established a UN Sanctions
Committee that imposed a range of sanctions on other Sudanese actors (including travel bans and
assets freezes). Remarkably, none of these applies to any of the ICC defendants. To be sure, the
standards employed to impose sanctions are not co-extensive with the standards employed for
issuing an arrest warrant. In particular, the former requires a host of bio-identifiers (national
identity number, proper name, etc.) in order to be effective. That said, if the Sanctions
Committee is able to create a dossier for the likes of Musa Hilal, a notorious janjiweed leader, it
should be able to pull something together for indicted government officials. Indeed, the whole
Bashir UNGA travel debacle might have been avoided if he had been the subject of a
comprehensive Security Council travel ban. The Panel of Experts of the Sudan Sanctions
Committee has recommended his inclusion several times, but members of the Council have
blocked his addition to the sanctions list. Were the Council to freeze assets of these defendants,
these funds could be used to pay reparations to victims and to cover legal fees of defendants who
claim indigency, thus alleviating the financial strain on the Court posed by Council referrals.
The Security Council must do more to render its ICC referrals effective, including through the
provision of more robust diplomatic support. Following the Prosecutor’s most recent report on
the Darfur situation in December 2013, the Council could issue a new resolution heightening the
duties of cooperation of all UN member states and encouraging them to do more to effectuate the
arrest warrants, working alone or collectively. Such a resolution could contain an express ban on
member states’ hosting ICC defendants, even for diplomatic gatherings. It could also explicitly
abrogate any head-of-state immunity Bashir might enjoy, dispelling any lingering legal
ambiguity in this regard. Working through the Sanctions Committee, the Council could also
institute a travel ban and other sanctions on Bashir and the other ICC indictees, which it has done
for other international outlaws.

Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the
cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (13 December 2011).

Another option would be for the Council to strengthen UNAMID’s mandate to give
peacekeepers the power to arrest ICC fugitives. Such an authority could be passive, authorizing
an arrest in the event peacekeepers encounter an indictee in the course of their normal duties and
if the tactical situation would allow it, which was the model first adopted in the former
Yugoslavia. Or, it could be more robust, enabling peacekeepers to hunt indictees down—the
policy eventually adopted in Bosnia. Although appealing, such a move would further jeopardize
UNAMID’s ability to operate in the country. The Council has already criticized Sudan for
placing “increased restrictions and bureaucratic impediments … upon UNAMID movement and
operations, particularly to areas of recent conflict.” Furthermore, Bashir’s repeated acts of
retaliation against humanitarian organizations reveal the depth of his willingness to sacrifice the
well-being of his own people to retain power and avoid accountability. It has been argued that
empowering UNAMID in this fashion would also threaten its credibility as a neutral steward of
operative peace agreements, including the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).34
No doubt, these concerns prompted the prior Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo,
to recommend against any such arrest authority when he delivered his fifteenth, and last, report
to the Council. Instead, he boldly suggested that the Council should consider asking UN
members and regional organizations to launch targeted arrest operations in furtherance of the
warrants. This could be done unilaterally or through an arrest working group composed of states
with the capacity and will to participate. Such “snatch and grab” operations are not
unprecedented. Indeed, a notable unilateral example is the United States’ recent capture of Abu
Anas al-Libi from Libya pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3052, which has been interpreted to grant the
Federal Bureau of Investigations broad apprehension authority in connection with crimes against
the United States, including permission to undertake the extraterritorial capture of an individual
without the cooperation or consent of the custodial state. In the past, the ad hoc tribunals have
generally adhered to the principle of male captus, bene detentus, which states that a fugitive
brought into a court’s jurisdiction by means of an illegal arrest or forcible abduction in violation
of the defendant’s rights or the rights of the territorial state does not automatically divest the
court of jurisdiction unless the individual is seriously mistreated by court personnel. The ICC
has yet to confront this issue, but it would have ample precedent to accept custody following
such an operation if it were so inclined.
Obviously, any of these options will require a significant amplification of political will among
members of the Council. Among the current crop of Council members, a record eleven have
ratified the Rome Statute (France, UK, Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Republic of
Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Nigeria). Significantly, this number is up from seven in
light of Jordan’s election to the surrendered Saudi seat. The P5 (only two of which are ICC
members) would have to consent to any increased engagement on the fugitive issue. Although
all five permanent members allowed the referral to go forward back in 2005, Russia and China
may be reluctant to authorize more concrete support for the Court’s cases in the referred
situations. Indeed, in connection with Ocampo’s final presentation to the Council, Russia
indicated that invoking Chapter VII to carry out arrest warrants “is unlikely to solve problems
arising for the ICC in the Sudan.” The U.S. for its part stated:
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We agree with the Prosecutor that the lack of progress to date in executing the
arrest warrants and bringing those most responsible to justice merits renewed
attention by the Council. We think it is a serious cause for concern that the
individuals subject to outstanding arrest warrants in the Darfur situation remain at
large and continue to travel across borders. This is an area where cooperation is
particularly crucial.
To that end, we continue to urge all States to refrain from providing political or
financial support to the Sudanese suspects subject to ICC arrest warrants and to
bring diplomatic pressure to bear on States that invite or host these individuals.
We stand with the many States that refuse to welcome the ICC indictees to their
countries, and we commend those that have spoken out against President AlBashir’s continued travel, including to next month’s African Union Summit. For
our part, the United States has continued to oppose invitations, facilitation or
support for travel by those subject to ICC arrest warrants in Darfur and to urge
other States to do the same.
We would welcome additional efforts by, and better coordination with, other
members of the international community on these issues. We encourage the
Council to consider creative approaches and new tools. As members of the
Security Council, we can and should review additional steps that could be taken to
carry out the ICC’s work in Darfur, execute outstanding arrest warrants and
ensure States’ compliance with relevant international obligations.
The Council must recognize that the flagrant impunity of the at-large Darfur defendants, and
Sudan’s recalcitrance in the face of its clear Charter obligations, present a serious challenge to
the credibility and authority of the Council (not to mention the ICC) that only it can rectify. The
Assembly of States Parties, working through the Bureau which has taken up this issue, should
maintain pressure on state parties that might have occasion to host Bashir.
At the same time, the U.N. must limit its own interactions with ICC defendants. The incident
discussed above in which ICC defendant Harun traveled on a UN helicopter was not the only
controversial contact between a U.N. official and an ICC defendant. There were allegations in
2009 that the U.N. Mission in the DRC (MONUC, since renamed MONUSCO) had offered
medical and transportation assistance to Sylvestre Mudacumura. More troubling, was a 2012
incident in which the joint UN-AU special representative to Darfur, Ibrahim Gambari, was
photographed socializing with ICC-indictee President Al Bashir at a wedding.
The UN has since issued a revised contacts policy, restricting UN engagement with individuals
subject to ICC arrest warrants to those contacts that “are strictly required for carrying out
essential UN mandate activities.” There are no restrictions on contacts with those who are the
subject of summons to appear (vice arrest warrants), as with the Kenyan defendants, and who are
cooperating with the Court. While this distinction ostensibly respects the principle of innocent
until proven guilty, it should not be forgotten that the confirmation of charges indicates that an
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) has determined that there were “substantial grounds to believe
that the person committed the crime charged” pursuant to Article 61(5), which might merit at
least some restrictions on non-essential contacts, such as at honorary, ceremonial, or social

events or courtesy calls. In addition, it is difficult, at times, to ensure that defendants subject to
summons are genuinely cooperating with the Court. In this regard, the assessment of the Office
of the Prosecutor as well as of states with particular insights gleaned from intelligence and other
sources should be given great weight.
This new contacts policy is considerably softer than prior practice as reflected in the policy
generated by the UN’s Office of the Legal Affairs. That longstanding policy governed the
contacts between UN representatives and persons indicted by all international courts who also
held positions of authority in their respective counties. It required that such contacts
should be limited to what is strictly required for carrying out UN mandated
activities. The presence of UN representatives in any ceremonial or similar
occasion with such individuals should be avoided. When contacts are absolutely
necessary, an attempt should be made to interact with non-indicted individuals of
the same group or party.35
Respecting the pronouncements of the Court confirming charges against individuals is an
essential element of the U.N.-ICC Relationship Agreement, which states at Article 3 that
The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view to facilitating the
effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate
closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other on matters
of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present Agreement and in
conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute.
To be sure, it is necessary to leave an opening for principals of the UN to maintain some contact
with ICC indictees (such as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous’s
multiple meetings with Bashir, the most recent being in July 2013) under exigent circumstances.
This is particularly true when there are peace talks underway that require a head of state or state
official to participate; however, the elements of “strictly required” and “essential … activities”
should be interpreted narrowly by those concerned to prevent all but the most pressing
engagements at which no other individual could represent the state in question. Isolating ICC
fugitives is crucial to respecting the authority of the Court and the principles of justice it
embodies as well as to signaling that an alleged involvement in international crimes has tangible
consequences. It also shows respect to victims and pays tribute to their suffering. If the UN
maintains the distinction between individuals subject to arrest warrants versus those voluntarily
appearing before the ICC, it should ensure that such individuals, and the government agencies
they control, are genuinely cooperating with the Court, in their public and their private actions.
Moreover, the UN should continually and critically assess whether its contacts with ICC
defendants have actually contributed to the effectuation of the UN mandate and related UN
efforts. As Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda argued to the Council in June 2013,
We must be careful not to embolden fugitives from justice into thinking that they
will be rewarded for manipulating their way into positions of indispensability
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even as they continue to commit crimes.36
Although this guidance has already been issued, it is not necessarily etched in stone. There
should be no “business as usual” when it comes individuals who are being prosecuted for the
worst crimes known to humankind.
This contacts policy governs only U.N. personnel. States parties, who are bound by the Rome
Statute’s cooperation regime, will need to devise a more rigorous contacts policy, especially for
individuals subject to arrest warrants. No matter how “essential” some contact may appear to be,
states parties are under a pre-existing duty to arrest and transfer such individuals. Coming up
with consensus language, however, has so far eluded the ASP some of whose members have
raised concerns about the creation of new legal obligations that might impinge on their ability to
manage their foreign relations.
3. Regional & Bilateral Pressure
Besides the ASP, there is no regional political body that is likely to be as effective as the
European Union and Commission were in pressuring the Balkan states to cooperate with the
ICTY. The most obvious candidate—the AU—has soured on the ICC, primarily surrounding the
Sudan and Kenya cases, although its membership is not monolithic in this regard. The World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank, with their ability to
condition their support on good governance and adherence to the rule of law, could be more
effective sources of influence.
Without an obvious multilateral lever, like-minded states will have to be willing to commit to
utilizing unilateral and coordinated forms of pressure and incentives (such as appropriations for
bilateral assistance, programming including capacity building, or participation in
intergovernmental organizations) for states that are either the unwilling host of fugitives or that
are providing them safe haven. For example, the United States’ refusal to attend a donor
conference for Serbia in Brussels in 2001 was instrumental in the ICTY’s gaining custody of
Slobodan Milošević. The United States also made certain types of aid (excluding humanitarian
and democratization aid) to Serbia dependent on a presidential certification that, inter alia, the
country had met certain conditions, including ICTY cooperation.37 Typically, Serbia would
arrest or facilitate the surrender of indictees to the Tribunal in the vicinity of the certification
deadline.38 Some aid was suspended over the years until all the indictees were finally in custody.
Although the World Bank or other IFIs might not take an institutional stand in favor of justice,
individual donor countries can always vote their shares in multilateral development banks and
other such fora in a way that encourages accountability and otherwise make cooperation with the
Court a condition for assistance. They could also encourage other members to do the same. For
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example, in the United States, legislation also gave congressional authorization to vote for the
provision of loans and aid from international financial institutions (IFIs) to the states of the
former Yugoslavia if the conditions were met. Similar voting guidance has been provided for
Sudan by way of the 2002 Sudan Peace Act, but is has not been linked to ICC cooperation or the
surrender of fugitives. The U.S. Department of Treasury is unlikely to withhold its IFI vote in
favor of a harboring state without some form of Congressional direction in this regard. Given
the high degree of congressional interest in capturing the LRA defendants and in the human
rights situation in the Sudan, this authorization might be obtainable even in today’s political
climate. More indirectly, donor states must continue to support justice and accountability
measures and to strengthen local capacity in areas victimized by the depredations of ICC
fugitives.
A state such as Sudan is largely impervious to many forms of pressure that would work on
weaker states, and it has the means to retaliate against states or organizations that might take
action against it. Members of the international community must thus actively seek new levers
against Sudan, including potential forms of financial pressure, as well as constructively engage
with states such as China and Russia that can exercise unique forms of influence.
4. Civil Society
NGOs and other civil society actors need to raise awareness of all fugitives, not just high profile
ones. The success of the Kony2012 movement in galvanizing political support for the hunt for
Joseph Kony, especially among young people, can be replicated for all fugitives, including those
who are less telegenic, such as Mudacumura. Civil society actors should also use all available
fora, including the Human Rights Council in Geneva and other treaty bodies, to pressure states to
adhere to their ICC obligations.
5. The Court
For its part, there are some steps that the Court, and specifically the Office of the Prosecutor,
should consider in order to effectuate its arrest warrants. The Court as a whole has already
begun working on arrest strategies and has pledged to issue focused and specific requests for
assistance. Continuing to issue sealed indictments, like those for two of the three CDI
defendants, and confidentially sharing information with trusted partners, is one aspect of this
strategy. The Court has also identified the need for:
a systematic results-orientated discussion among States Parties on concrete steps
or measures that can be taken to facilitate arrests, in particular with regards to
explicit situations and obstacles faced by the Court…
Several meetings of representatives of the Court, States Parties, INTERPOL, the U.N. Office of
Legal Affairs, civil society, and experts from the ad hoc tribunals have taken place to share
experiences in this regard.
The OTP also should move forward with its consideration of a dedicated tracking team like those
of the ad hoc tribunals to seek out those individuals whose whereabouts are unknown or even to
remain aware of the movements of those individuals who are not at large. Such a team could
foster cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, develop contacts within the local
population, recruit and cultivate sources and informants, manage and contain security risks, and

coordinate with personnel engaged in substantive investigations. Such a team would have to
operate with the consent of the territorial state, although it would no doubt benefit from the
Security Council giving it a boost in an overarching international justice resolution. ICC
members and other concerned states should enter into confidentiality agreements with the OTP
to enable information sharing about the whereabouts of fugitives. The OTP should also consider
making more concrete requests of the Council for forms of assistance it might render in
furtherance of its referrals.
Finally, the OTP also must ensure that its cases are strong and compelling. If the cases prove to
be weak, it might discourage members of the international community from taking bold but
politically-difficult steps to effectuate the Court’s arrest warrants.
Conclusion
The situation of each fugitive is unique, and the entire international community—ICC member
states, other “friends of the Court”, Security Council members, and civil society—must work
together to harmonize a range of coercive measures, appeals to self-interest, and forms of
normative persuasion to maximum effect. The project of international criminal law and the
imperative of justice demand such concerted efforts to ensure that fugitives are not allowed to
enjoy impunity or safe haven. To be sure, this is a long game, but one that can be accelerated
and won if the political will is there. The victims of horrific international crimes deserve nothing
less.

